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Abstract 
After a brief outline of his method, the paper discusses Husserl‘s view of 
mathematics by means of two theses, namely the Incompleteness Claim and 
the Dependence Claim, with which Øystein Linnebo (2008) has characterized 
non-eliminative structuralism as opposed to the more traditional Platonist 
view of mathematics. According to the Incompleteness Claim, mathematical 
objects are incomplete in the sense that they have no non-structural 
properties. The Dependence Claim holds that the mathematical objects are 
dependent on each other and/or structure to which they belong. Husserl‘s 
view is shown to be a combination view: It is generally a species of non-
eliminative structuralism, of which the two claims hold. However, in addition 
the Incompleteness Claim motivates constructivist approach to the 
mathematical objects. Moreover, due to the ―thinness‖ of his ―mathematics-
first‖ approach, he is also open to the more traditionally Platonist approaches 
to mathematical objects. 
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1. Introduction, Husserl’s method: radikale 
Besinnung 
Husserl‘s philosophy of mathematics is primarily a 
method with which to approach mathematics. Hence, any 
attempt to explain his views about mathematics has to be 
preceded by an account of the used method. He explained it in 
the most mature way in the introduction to the Formal and 
Transcendental Logic (1929), where Husserl claims that the 
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work is a result of Besinnung (for more detail, see Hartimo 
2018a).  He defines Besinnung as follows:  
“Besinnung signifies nothing but the attempt actually to produce the 
sense ‗itself‘, …, it is the attempt to convert the ‗intentive sense‘ … 
the sense ‗vaguely floating before us‘ in our unclear aiming, into the 
fulfilled, the clear, sense, and thus to procure for it the evidence of its 
clear possibility‖ (Husserl 1969, 9).1  
Assuming that rational activities are goal directed, 
Besinnung means clarifying the sense of the activity by 
explicating the typically implicit goals that guide the activity. 
Husserl assessed these goals by looking at the history of formal 
sciences, from ancients onwards, trying to capture the ―point‖ of 
these sciences and how the mathematicians‘ goals are situated 
within the tradition of formal sciences. He sorted these 
activities into two kinds: to formal mathematics that has non-
contradictoriness as its primary goal. The search for this is 
manifested in the search for definite manifolds. In logic, that is 
theory of science, the primary goal is truth.  
 According to Husserl, finding out what people, here the 
scientists, are aiming at requires entering in ―a community of 
empathy with the scientists‖ [Mit den Wissenschaftlern in 
Einfühlungsgemeinschaft stehend oder tretend] (Husserl 1969, 9; 
Hua 17, 8). Husserl thus claims that Formal and Transcendental 
Logic (1929) is based on his empathetic engagement with the 
goals of the mathematicians and logicians around him (see 
Hartimo 2018b for the list of books he had read). Indeed, Formal 
and Transcendental Logic can be read as a commentary on 
foundations of mathematics and logic in the 1920s, and 
especially of David Hilbert‘s aims (Hartimo 2017).  
The role of transcendental phenomenology is crucial for 
Husserl‘s method. Transcendental logic is ultimately about 
examining the presuppositions assumed in formal sciences and 
clarifying the evidence striven at in them. In other words, it is 
examination of mathematicians‘ aims, i.e., reflection of what 
exactly mathematicians are after when they seek non-
contradictoriness or truth. Husserl‘s transcendental reflections 
showed that pure mathematics is guided by what he calls 
evidence of distinctness, that is, Deutlichkeit. In contrast, logic, 
striving at critically verified judgments, aims at having the 
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objects themselves in the evidence of clarity, Klarheit. Husserl 
claims that the difference between the kinds of evidence made 
him realize that pure mathematics (what Husserl calls formal 
mathematics) has to be separated from logic that has a 
(different) notion of truth as its goal. In a way then, 
transcendental logic served to Husserl as a heuristic device for 
foundational research. However, its primary aim is to sort out 
conceptual confusions and making sure that the activities have 
a ―point‖ that its practitioners have a clear awareness of. With 
the help of transcendental logic, the norms guiding formal 
mathematics and logic could be clarified, and if needed, revised. 
In starting from examining mathematicians‘ activities 
and in the attempt of making sense of these activities, Husserl‘s 
approach is ―mathematics first‖, and reminiscent of Penelope 
Maddy‘s naturalistic method, summarized to be to: ―identify the 
goals and evaluate the methods by their relations to those 
goals‖ (Maddy 1997, 194).  To be sure, Husserl incorporates into 
it transcendental phenomenological reflection, which is not of 
interest to Maddy. Nevertheless, his method is similarly 
―mathematics-first‖ and in it activities are criticized in so far as 
they do not serve the purposes they were supposed to, or their 
goals are unclear, conflated, or confused. The clarification of 
these goals leads to amelioration of the used concepts so that 
the renewed norms will be adopted habitually into the 
practices. Thus Husserl‘s ―mathematics-first‖ approach is also 
revisionist: transcendental and historical study aims at finding 
out what the used concepts, norms, and values should be. 
However, this is not philosophy-first revisionism, in which, in 
words of Shapiro, ―[t]he criticism does come from outside, from 
pre-conceived first principles‖ (Shapiro 2012, 13). It is criticism 
that arises from the consideration of the goals and values 
within the activities themselves.  This may lead to embracing a 
plurality of normative goals, as I believe Husserl was led to. 
Despite of this, Husserl‘s picture is not relativist either: it aims 
at one unified picture within which all genuine practices have 
their proper roles. In it the confused goals and aims of the 
mathematicians are clarified and sorted out to form one 
sensible whole. 
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In what follows I will try to draw a picture of this whole 
as it seems to have looked to Husserl, when approached with 
the method characterized above. I will argue that Husserl sees 
mathematics mainly as a structuralist enterprise. I will argue 
that his structuralism differs from the more traditional 
Platonism and is Platonist in a ―Lotzean‖ sense. Husserl also 
finds a need for more ―material determination,‖ which shows in 
his occasional constructivism. Finally, Husserl is open to a 
possibility of there being Platonistic, independent abstract 
objects, if mathematics develops in the way that commits 
mathematicians‘ to their existence. Thus, his view can be 
characterized to be a combination view, a combination of 
structuralism, constructivism, and even Platonism – all 
considered ―thinly,‖ as views to which mathematicians are 
committed, rather than as philosophical postulations about 
what there is.    
 
2. Husserl’s non-eliminative structuralism vs. 
Platonism: Dependence and Incompleteness 
The role of Besinnung in Husserl‘s methodology makes 
his views contextual and ―mathematics first‖. It led Husserl to a 
belief that mathematics is ultimately about striving for 
―definite manifolds‖, domains of categorical theories that should 
also be syntactically complete – something to which he still 
refers to in FTL (Hua 17, §31). Husserl‘s structuralism is 
particularly clear in the following passage from the 
Prolegomena (1900):  
―The objective correlate of the concept of a possible theory, definite 
only in respect of form, is the concept of a possible field of knowledge 
over which a theory of this form will preside. Such a field is, however, 
known in mathematical circles as a manifold. It is accordingly a field 
which is uniquely and solely determined by falling under a theory of 
such a form, whose objects are such as to permit of certain 
associations which fall under certain basic laws of this or that 
determinate form (here the only determining feature). The objects 
remain quite indefinite as regards their matter, to indicate which the 
mathematician prefers to speak of them as ‗thought-objects‘. They are 
not determined directly as individual or specific singulars, nor 
indirectly by way of their material species or genera, but solely by the 
form of the connections attributed to them. These laws then, as they 
determine a field and its form, likewise determine the theory to be 
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constructed, or more correctly, the theory‘s form. In the theory of 
manifolds, e.g. ‗+‘ is not the sign for numerical addition, but for any 
connection for which laws of the form a + b = b + a etc., hold. The 
manifold is determined by the fact that its thought-objects permit of 
these ‗operations‘ (and of others whose compatibility with these can 
be shown a priori).‖ (Husserl 1970, 156; Hua 18, §70) 
A formally definite manifold has a form. In terms 
defined by Stewart Shapiro this form is a structure: ―A 
structure is the abstract form of a system, highlighting the 
interrelationships among the objects, and ignoring any features 
of them that do not affect how they relate to other objects in the 
system‖ (1997, 74). The objects, the pure positions in the 
structure, are abstract ―thought-objects.‖ They are determined 
―solely by the form of the connections attributed to them‖. They 
comprise what Husserl calls a ‗manifold’, and formal 
mathematics is about such manifolds and their relationships to 
each other. Husserl seems to suggest that the formally definite 
manifolds are domains of categorical theories, i.e., theories for 
which any two realizations are isomorphic with each other. For 
Husserl, the ―thought-objects‖ are bona fide objects, even 
though they are only ―formally determined.‖ (To anticipate 
what is to come later, Husserl seems to have two notions of 
definiteness in mind: one merely formal, and the other more 
―material.‖) Husserl‘s discussion of mathematical objects by 
means of structures does not aim at eliminating them, but at 
demarcating a legitimate domain of formal objects. Husserl‘s 
structuralism is thus a species of non-eliminative structuralism 
(cf. Parsons 2008, 52).  
On Husserl‘s view, the mathematicians are thus 
committed to the existence of abstract objects in so far as they 
are guided by the notion of definite manifold (HUA 17 §31). To 
determine how his view relates to Platonism about 
mathematics, it is very useful to consider two claims, termed 
Incompleteness Claim and Dependence Claim, with which 
Øystein Linnebo (2008) has characterized mathematical (non-
eliminative) structuralism. The Incompleteness Claim holds 
that mathematical objects are incomplete in the sense that they 
have no non-structural properties. According to the Dependence 
Claim the mathematical objects are dependent on each other 
and/or structure to which they belong. The more traditional 
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Platonists differ from structuralists in ascribing richer and 
more independent nature to the mathematical objects.  
On Husserl‘s Prolegomena formulation given above, both 
of these claims hold. The mathematical objects are ―quite 
indefinite as regards to their matter‖ and ―They are not 
determined directly as individual or specific singulars, nor 
indirectly by way of their material species or genera, but solely 
by the form of the connections attributed to them‖ 
(Incompleteness), and they are determined ―solely by the form 
of the connections attributed to them‖ (Dependence). Husserl 
further explains that this approach banishes ―all metaphysical 
fog and all mysticism from the mathematical investigations in 
question‖ (Huserl 1970, 157 [§70]). Husserl wrote this remark 
when he was in Halle with Georg Cantor as his colleague, so 
the suspicion is that the remark is directed at Cantor. In his 
Grundlagen, Cantor explicitly suggested that his definition of a 
manifold or a set captures something akin to the Platonic idea 
(Cantor 1996, 916). Whether Husserl thinks of Cantor or not, 
consistently with his remark about ―metaphysical fog‖ 
(Prolegomena, §70), in the [Logical] Investigations (II, § 7), 
Husserl is critical of Platonic realism, i.e., ―the metaphysical 
hypostatization of the universal, the assumption that the Species 
really exists externally to thought‖ (Husserl 1970, 248). On this 
formulation universals are given richer nature and independence, 
which is ruled out with the two structuralist claims.  
However, to Brentano Husserl has conceded that 
already the Prolegomena had been influenced by Lotze's 
interpretation of Plato (BW 1, 39). In his attempt to rewrite the 
introduction to the 1913 edition of the Logical Investigations 
Husserl credits Lotze‘s discussion of Plato for his development 
towards anti-psychological idea of logic, calling Lotze‘s 
interpretation genial:  
―The fully conscious and radical turn and the related „Platonism― I 
owe to the study of Lotze‘s Logik. As little as Lotze himself could 
overcome contradictions and psychologism, as much his genial 
interpretation of Platonic ideas helped me and my further studies. 
Lotze‘s discussion of truths in themselves suggested to me the 
thought to place all mathematics and a good part of traditional logic 
into the realm of ideality.‖ (Hua 20/1, 297)  
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For Lotze‘s Plato, the ideas do not exist as things do, but 
they possess validity in virtue of the relations between them.2 
On Lotze‘s view the Platonic ideas are thus dependent on other 
ideas and the structure they are a part of. Husserl‘s view could 
thus be said to be Platonist in Lotze‘s sense, that is, within the 
limits of the two structuralist theses.  
In sum, for Husserl the structures, i.e., the unique formal 
domains, form a clearly circumscribed idea of the ―essential 
content of logic‖ (Hua 18, §3). In so doing, they banish ―the 
metaphysical fog‖ out of his Platonism in substituting modern 
mathematics in place of the doctrine of ideas in Lotze‘s Plato. In 
mathematics, the structures, but nothing else, exist ―in 
themselves‖. Stewart Shapiro calls this kind of structuralism 
ante rem structuralism in accordance to the traditional 
distinction between ante rem and in re theories of universals.3 
 
3. Structuralism and its thinness in Husserl’s later 
works 
Husserl‘s ante rem structuralism can be found more or 
less unchanged in Husserl‘s Ideen I (1913). In it, the notion of 
definite manifolds is presented as an ideal norm for scientific 
rationality (Hua I, §72). Husserl writes, for example, that  
―the closer an experiential science comes to the ‗rational‘ level, the 
level of ‗exact,‘ of nomological science - ….- the greater will become 
the scope and power of its cognitive-practical performance.‖ (Husserl 
1982, 19; Hua 3/1, §9) 
The definite manifolds provide the empty forms of any 
region whatever. Husserl defines this as formal ontology that 
thus contains the forms of all ontologies ―and prescribes for 
material ontologies a formal structure common to them all‖ 
(Hua 3/1, §10). Husserl establishes the term ―essence‖ to refer 
to mathematical objects ―themselves‖:  
―One occasionally reads in a treatise that the series of cardinal 
numbers is a series of concepts and then, a little further on, that 
concepts are products of thinking. At first cardinal numbers 
themselves, the essences, were thus designated as concepts. But are 
not cardinal numbers, we ask, what they are regardless of whether 
we ‗form‘ or do not form them?‖ (Husserl 1982, 42)  
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These essences still conform to categorical axiomatic 
theories, so that, considered purely formally, there are mere 
essence-forms (i.e., the thought-objects of the Prolegomena) that 
fit all possible essences. Husserl also points out that these exact 
essences should be regarded as Kantian ideas (Husserl 1982, 
97; Hua 3/1, §83). As such they have a normative, guiding role 
for our perception and also for concept formation.  
In the Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929) Husserl 
explains that the concept of the definite manifold ―has 
continually guided mathematics from within‖ (Hua 17, §31; 
Husserl 1969, 95); it is thus a typical example of goal-senses he 
thinks guides mathematics and is revealed to him by 
Besinnung. Husserl cites his Prolegomena discussion of the 
definite manifolds and terms pure positions, i.e., thought-
objects (Prolegomena), essence-forms (Ideas I), as ‗pure modes 
of anything-whatever‘ (Hua 17, §24; Husserl 1969, 78). In his 
transcendental examination of the givenness of the objects 
(whether abstract or real), Husserl describes them as 
somethings-themselves that are transcendent (§61). In other 
words, even though the mathematical objects are dependent, 
they nevertheless are given as bona fide objects, transcendent 
even though ideal. He also refers to the axiomatic ideal as a 
regulative ideal norm ―beneath actually experienced Nature‖ 
(Husserl 1969, 292; Hua 17, 257).  
But then in the Crisis, written in the 1930s Husserl 
suddenly renounces such realism as a misleading view:  
―Mathematics and mathematical science, as a garb of ideas, or the 
garb of symbols of the symbolic mathematical theories, encompasses 
everything which, for scientists and the educated generally, 
represents the life-world, dresses it up as "objectively actual and 
true" nature. It is through the garb of ideas that we take for true 
being what is actually a method—a method which is designed for the 
purpose of progressively improving, in infinitum, through "scientific" 
predictions, those rough predictions which are the only ones 
originally possible within the sphere of what is actually experienced 
and experienceable in the lifeworld. It is because of the disguise of 
ideas that the true meaning of the method, the formulae, the 
"theories," remained unintelligible and, in the naive formation of the 
method, was never understood.‖ (Husserl 1976, §9h). 
Until the Crisis, Husserl‘s view of mathematics is a 
species of non-eliminative structuralism, in particular ante rem 
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structuralism, which however explicitly turns into a normative 
ideal, or an ideal which reason places into nature. It is the 
―garb of ideas that we take for true being‖ as he puts it in the 
above quote. But this is an illusion, in fact, the ―substructed‖ 
structure is only a method. Husserl is now instrumentalist 
about the structures.  
This turn of the events can be explained in many ways, 
for example, psychologically as a result of a general crisis 
Husserl went through in the early 1930s. A philosophically 
more satisfactory explanation highlights the importance of 
Husserl‘s newly acquired awareness of the Löwenheim-Skolem 
Theorem.  Husserl‘s primary source to developments in the 
foundations of mathematics in the 1930s, around the time he 
was writing the Crisis was Friedrich Waismann‗s (1896-1959) 
Einführung in das mathematische Denken: die Begriffsbildung 
der modernen Mathematik (1936).4 In this work Waismann 
states about unique structures of natural (and later similarly 
also of real numbers) that:  
―It is now extremely significant that Skolem has thwarted every hope 
of this kind. That is, he proved a general proposition which says that it 
is impossible to characterize the number series by finitely many 
axioms. For, every statement which is valid in the arithmetic of 
natural numbers is also valid for structures of another kind, so that it 
is impossible to distinguish the number series by any inner properties 
from sequences of another kind.‖ (Waismann 1936, 84; 1966, 105) 
On Waismann‘s understanding Löwenheim-Skolem 
Theorems show that there are no unique structures such as the 
structure of natural numbers or the structure of reals. It makes 
Husserl‘s belief in formal structures underlying his view of 
formal ontology a wild goose chase. Either Husserl should have 
shown the well-known results false, or else he had to admit that 
his own earlier beliefs were illusions. Husserl chose the latter 
alternative. This development of Husserl‘s views from ante rem 
structuralism to instrumentalism about the structures show 
that his metaphysical commitments cannot be discussed 
independently of his Besinnung, that is, his understanding of 
the mathematicians‘ view about the nature of mathematics. 
Instead of taking it as a philosophy-first defense of a certain 
metaphysical position, Husserl‘s view is about mathematicians‘ 
view of the mathematical reality.  
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4. The incompleteness of mathematical objects and 
Husserl’s constructivist leanings 
In the above analyses, I have mainly assessed Husserl‘s 
view of mathematical objects in terms of the Dependence Claim, 
i.e., the claim that mathematical objects are dependent on each 
other or the structure to which they belong to.  I will now move 
on to consider the Incompleteness of mathematical objects. 
According to this claim, the structuralist objects are pure 
positions of structures, and thus they have no identity or 
features outside of a structure.  Husserl puts this kind of claim 
forward in the Prolegomena in the passage cited already once: 
―The objects remain quite indefinite as regards their matter, to 
indicate which the mathematician prefers to speak of them as 
‗thought-objects‘. They are not determined directly as individual or 
specific singulars, nor indirectly by way of their material species or 
genera, but solely by the form of the connections attributed to them‖ 
(Husserl 1970, 156; Hua 18, §70).  
The incompleteness of structuralist objects has been 
criticized in the literature. Probably the best-known criticism is 
due to Paul Benacerraf (Benacerraf 1964, 291). The argument 
is that it must be possible to individuate the abstract objects 
independently of the role they play in the structure. The 
structuralist objects are ―incomplete,‖ because they can only be 
ascribed certain properties defined by the structure. This 
indeterminateness poses problems for example for the 
applications of mathematics (Parsons 2008, 106, 151).  
Husserl‘s view with regard to the Incompleteness Claim 
is extremely interesting. He acknowledges that the thought-
objects are incomplete, and have no more nature than what the 
structure ascribes to them. But to him, this motivates using 
constructive means to further determine these otherwise 
incomplete objects. Linnebo would call this a ―compromise 
view‖. He interestingly takes Kant to represent such a view 
with his [Kant‘s] distinction between totum analyticum (totality 
prior to its constituents) and totum syntheticum (totality 
synthesized from its parts) (Linnebo 2008). 
Indeed, the incompleteness or inauthenticity of the 
structuralist objects occupied mathematicians already in the 19th 
century. In the 19th century the problem was typically construed 
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in terms of existence; it seemed that the structuralist ―thought-
objects‖ could not be thought as properly existing as such but 
their existence had to be established by some other means. 
Dedekind, too, established the existence of the simply infinite 
systems by correlating them with the realm of things that can be 
objects of his own thought (Dedekind 1996, 806-807).  
Sometimes the worry about the actual existence of the 
structural objects was related to the worry about their 
applicability. Citing Frege‘s remark that ―It is applicability 
alone that raises arithmetic from the rank of a game to that of a 
science. Applicability therefore belongs to it of necessity‖ 
(Grundgesetze II §91, cited by Parsons 2008, 73), Parsons (2008) 
points out that Frege and Russell seemed to have regarded this 
as an objection towards structuralists.  
Husserl shared such concerns. Accordingly, in his Double 
Lecture he first discusses manifolds as structures, holding that 
such a domain is ―a determinate, but formally defined, manifold‖ 
[in German ―eine bestimmte, aber formal definierte 
Mannigfaltigkeit‖]. The expression invites the thought that there 
could be also materially determined manifolds; and as we go 
further, it becomes clear that this indeed seems to have been 
Husserl‘s idea, and that the sought for ―material determination‖ 
is related to computable constructibility. This is because the 
purely formal mathematics is difficult to apply. In the Double 
Lecture, Husserl writes for example that: ―But the difficulties lie 
precisely in the relationship between formal mathematics and its 
employment in substantive mathematics or in the particular 
domains of knowledge‖ (Husserl 2003, 411 {92}). He then starts 
developing a more constructive method to determine the objects, 
with a view to determine the objects more individually (see 
Hartimo 2018c): 
―The essential point is the following: In the axiom system I define not 
only sentences which hold true for all members of the manifold in 
general. I therefore operate not only with general, indeterminate 
concepts of objects, but rather I also introduce individually 
designating concepts of objects – as it were proper names for objects 
(or species of objects) – and I axiomatically establish their existence‖ 
(Husserl 2003, 445 {116}). 
He seems to have thought that for the sake of 
application the formal objects should have more ―material‖ 
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definiteness. To enable the use of the formal objects he 
correlated them, or named them, with determinate numbers, 
and then established the ―term-re-writing‖ reductions to 
equalities. Thus he came to give the criteria of identity for 
different kinds of expressions of natural numbers (see Hartimo 
2018c). Similarly motivated, in Ideas I Husserl adds to 
structuralist formal ontology material ontologies by means of 
eidetics, and in Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl 
regarded the structuralist objects too abstract to have 
something to do with truth related to experience of objects 
‗themselves‘:  
―Each multiplicity defined by a system of axiom-forms presented 
them with the task of explicitly constructing the form of the 
corresponding deductive science itself; and the execution of the task 
involved precisely the same work of constructive deduction that is 
done in a concrete deductive science with concepts having material 
contents‖ (Husserl 1969, 98; Hua 17, §32).  
In the end, for him, the proper objects of formal ontology 
have to be intuited, whether immediately or mediately. They 
must draw ‗fullness‘ from the evidence of clarity (e.g., Husserl 
1969, 203). For Husserl, this takes place in judgments about 
individuals. The evidence can be ‗transferred‘ by the rules of the 
judgment theory to more complex judgments (I discuss this in 
more detail in Hartimo, forthcoming). These evident judgments 
determine the objects suitably for the needs of sciences and 
truth. Husserl thus thinks that formal mathematics should be 
thus constructively proven, and thus it should be ideally, not 
only formally, but also materially definite.  
But in line of his ―mathematics first‖ attitude, Husserl 
also writes that this kind of evidence is of no particular interest 
to mathematicians (Husserl 1969, 203), to whom distinctness, 
instead of clarity is of interest. (ibid., §52-53). The existence of 
abstract objects in Husserl‘s view can thus be either thin or 
thick, either as indeterminate thought-objects (in pure 
mathematics) or else as immediately or mediately evident 
objects (in logic). While the structuralist mathematical objects 
are distinctly given, Husserl clearly thinks that it would be 
desirable to bring them into evidence of clarity. For Husserl 
then, the Incompleteness Claim and the Dependence Claims do 
Mirja Hartimo / On Husserl‘s Thin Combination View: Structuralism, constructivism 
441 
 
 
not hold of all mathematical objects; they do not hold of the 
constructed formal objects that are given in the evidence of 
clarity. Husserl often seems to imply that all structuralist 
formal objects could be constructively given. This is a belief that 
the development of mathematics showed false in the 1930s. 
Given his methodological, ―mathematics-first‖ views, it should 
not be taken as a thesis about the nature of mathematics but 
rather as a belief about what he thought mathematicians of his 
time were thinking about mathematics, hence dependent on the 
stage of mathematical research.  
 
5. Husserl and the iterative conception of sets  
Linnebo (2008) discusses sets on the iterative conception 
as a counter-example to the structuralist Dependence Claim. 
Since sets are formed from their elements, the elements of the 
sets have to be ―available‖ before they can be comprehended 
into a set. The elements of the sets are thus not dependent of 
the sets they are members of. The sets they will be members of 
may not even yet exist on iterative conception. In it sets are 
formed in stages so that on each stage the sets will be formed 
from the objects of the previous stage. This results in an open-
ended hierarchy that can always be further extended (Linnebo 
2008, 2013). The cumulative hierarchy motivates most of the 
axioms of set theory, rendering them in some sense evident 
(Boolos‘s phrase is that ―there is a thought behind‖ it) (Linnebo 
2017, 140), and I will argue next that this kind of evidence 
could have well be of interest to Husserl, too.   
This brings us to a consideration about Husserl and the 
Dependence Claim, but this time possibly in favor of the more 
traditional Platonism. While in the case of constructive 
judgment theory the fullness is added to the background 
structure, set theory might suggest a Platonist departure from 
structuralism. Husserl may have known about iterative 
conception of sets developed by Zermelo.5 Zermelo‘s iterative 
view of sets postulates a dynamic, open-ended sequence of 
bigger and bigger domains (models), uniquely characterized by 
the cardinality of their basis and a ―boundary number‖ that is 
the least ordinal not in the model. In the hierarchy of models, 
the sets of one layer are ‗grounded‘ [würzelnd] in the preceding 
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layers, so that their elements are in the previous layers and 
serve as material for the following layers (Zermelo 1996, 1219).  
There are some indications in Husserl‘s texts that might 
indicate awareness of Zermelo‘s cumulative hierarchy, or at 
least some similar phenomenon. In FTL, for example, in the 
context of discussing idealizations involved in analytics and, in 
particular, the fundamental form ‗and so forth‘, Husserl 
discusses the reiterational ‗infinity‘ that is presupposed in 
mathematics that ―is the realm of infinite constructions, a 
realm of ideal existences, not only of ‗infinite‘ senses but also of 
constructional infinities‖ (§74). And then he continues:  
―Obviously we have here a repetition of the problem concerning 
subjective constitutive origins: as the hidden method of constructions 
which is to be uncovered and reshaped as a norm, the method by 
which ‗and so forth‘, in various senses, and infinities as categorial 
formations of a new sort become evident… Precisely this evidence, in 
all its particular formations, must now become a theme‖ (Husserl 
1969, 189; Hua 17, §74)  
Husserl refers to a new kind of evidence related to 
―constructional infinities.‖ The new task of transcendental 
phenomenology would then be to examine the notion of 
evidence involved.  
A possible reference to the cumulative hierarchy can be 
found in Husserl‘s correspondence with Dietrich Mahnke. In a 
letter to Mahnke in 1933 Husserl discusses his view of the 
infiniteness of transcendental subjectivity and infinity or 
endlessness of phenomenology, which studies the infinity of 
being within the totality [Alleinheit]. He calls the transcendental 
subjectivity as ‗constitutive infinity‘ and then compares it to the 
infiniteness of the structural system of the world:   
―The infiniteness of the world, the infiniteness of teleology, that, as the 
world that prevails for the infinity of monads, recedes and becomes, in 
evermore new and changing ways, but yet remains as one identical 
world, - that is not a one-dimensional or multi-dimensional infinity, it 
is an infinite system of rays of infinity, I think with an infinity of 
levels, that each has its axiomatics.‖ (BW3, 498)6 
In fact, Husserl‘s use of the word ―Strahlensystem von 
Unendlichkeiten‖ is curious. The reference to an infinity of 
levels, Stufen, could be informed by Zermelo‘s cumulative 
hierarchy introduced in (Zermelo 1996) or it could refer to 
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Gödel‘s incompleteness results and the ensuing infinity of 
axiomatizations where the Gödel sentence is decided by 
adopting a hierarchy of ever stronger theories in which the 
Gödel sentence of the previous level can be decided. The 
topological wording is curious and suggests something related 
to Riemann. In any case, it indicates Husserl‘s general attitude 
towards mathematics at the time to be one that endorses a kind 
of inexhaustibility or incompleteability: one cannot exhaust the 
reality with any finite set of axioms.  In Zermelo‘s hierarchy 
individual domains may be uniquely characterized, which thus 
suggest structuralist existence for the objects defined by them 
and relative to them. But the characterization of the infinite 
sequence of them makes existence claims about, e.g., boundary 
numbers. So, the question arises: ―does this make Husserl more 
traditionally Platonist, after all?‖ Indeed, for Husserl, this 
seems to be a question about the evidence related to ―and so 
forth,‖ to which he refers to already in the FTL. In any case, 
whether the cumulative hierarchy can be understood 
structurally or not, Husserl‘s methodological considerations 
imply that he should think that the task of transcendental logic 
is to examine any kind of evidence that surfaces in 
mathematics, hence certainly the one given by cumulative 
hierarchy. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In sum, while Husserl‘s (to be more specific, Husserl‘s 
view of mathematicians‘) view of mathematics is mostly ante 
rem structuralist, a closer examination of the Dependence and 
Incompleteness Claims shows that his ante rem structuralism 
does not hold of all mathematical objects. It holds of algebraic 
structures, hence much of what is studied in mathematics. 
Husserl would also like to bring as much of it as possible into 
clarity by means of computable constructions. Thus Husserl‘s 
structuralism has preferably ―thick constructive patches,‖ but it 
is also open to there being Platonist objects beyond it.  
These different approaches ultimately differ in their 
normative goals, in particular, in the kinds of evidence they are 
after. Depending on the kind of evidence, different kinds of 
methods of proofs and definitions are adopted in different areas. 
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Husserl‘s transcendental logic demands consideration of these 
various evidences, purifying them [his terms], and then, if 
found worthy, adopting them as new norms guiding 
mathematical practices. In the Formal and Transcendental 
Logic these goals were divided into two main kinds of 
evidences: clarity and distinctness. In the early 20th century the 
distinction between these two kinds of evidences provided an 
important new insight to the developing modern structural 
mathematics as opposed to the more constructive or applied 
approaches. Nothing in Husserl‘s approach precludes new 
evidences and new goals to surface in mathematics. 
Consideration of all of them and how they relate to each other 
gives a unified picture of pluralistically given mathematics and 
should help in understanding its place in our conception of the 
world and our lives. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1 ―Besinnung besagt nichts anderes als Versuch der wirklichen Herstellung 
des Sinnes ‚selbst‗, der in der bloβen Meinung gemeinter, vorausgesetzter ist; 
oder den Versuch, den ‚intendierenden Sinn‗, ... den im unklaren Abzielen 
‚vage vorschwebenden‗ in den erfüllten Sinn, den klare überzuführen, ihm 
also die Evidenz der klaren Möglichkeit zu verschaffen― (Hua 17, 8). 
2 Lotze concludes his discussion of Plato‘s Ideenlehre as follows ―Thus we 
readily understand the significance of Plato‘s endeavour to bind together the 
predicates which are found in the things of the external world in continual 
change, into a determinate and articulated whole, and how he saw in this 
world of Ideas the true beginnings of certain knowledge; for the eternal 
relations which subsist between different Ideas, and through which some are 
capable of association with each other and others exclude each other, form at 
all events the limits within which what is to be possible in experience falls; 
the further question what is real in it, and how things manage to have Ideas 
for their predicates, appeared to Plato not to be the primary, and was for the 
time reserved.‖(Lotze 1884, §315). After having established the unchangeable 
validity of the world of Ideas, the next task for Plato ―was to investigate the 
universal laws which govern its structure, through which alone, in an Ideal 
world as elsewhere, the individual elements can be bound together into a whole‖ 
(Lotze 1884, §321). Thus the Dependence Claim is true of Lotze‘s Plato.  
3 Shapiro‘s ante rem structuralism is a species of Parsons‘ non-eliminative 
structuralism, but not vice versa. Parsons‘ structures are not defined by 
Dedekind abstraction but by taking the language of mathematics as the 
background structure. On Parsons‘ view, the most elementary way of 
describing a mathematical structure is by introducing a one-place predicate 
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true of an object, with other predicates and functors true of this same object. 
The uniqueness is not central to him but the intended interpretations of the 
language of mathematics, which quantify over formal objects that are then, in 
a Quinean manner, thought to exist (Parsons 2004; Parsons 2008, esp. 111-
115). In contrast to Shapiro, in the dilemma between first order logic and 
determinate ontology, Quine and Parsons opt for the first option on the 
expense of the latter.  
4 In the end of Mathematische Existenz, Oskar Becker discusses Löwenheim-
Skolem theorem. However, Husserl probably did not read it until in Mars 
1937. According to Husserl-Chronik, this is when ―H. hat grössere Abschnitte 
gelesen (insbesondere zum ersten Mal auch [?] die zweite Hälfte) von Oskar 
Becker, Mathematische Existenz, 1927.‖ (Schuhmann 1977, 484) 
5 The theory was developed by Zermelo in Freiburg, where Husserl, too, lived 
at the time (Zermelo 1996). It seems likely that Zermelo‘s theory is at least 
indirectly influenced by Husserl. Husserl‘s assistant of the time, Oskar 
Becker, apparently had lectured in Zermelo‘s seminar on problems in the 
theory of transfinite ordinals that same year (Mancosu 2010, 281, 539). 
Becker in turn, in his discussion of transfinite ―Strukturkomplikationen‖ of 
the consciousness refers to Husserl‘s Ideas I (§100), where Husserl discusses 
hierarchical structures of intentionalities, such as remembering in 
remembering and so forth. Husserl thinks that they build up a hierarchy. 
According to him, ―[a]ll the types of objectivation-modifications previously 
dealt with are always accessible for always newer hierarchical formations of 
such a kind that the intentionalities in the noesis and noema are 
hierarchically built up on one another or, rather, in a unique way, encased in 
one another‖. The intentional acts and the objectifications of them allow for a 
hierarchy of levels of them. Husserl even assigns indices for these levels. ―To 
every noematic level there belongs a characteristic appropriate to that level as 
a kind of index with which each thing characterized manifests itself as 
belonging to its level… For indeed to every level belong possible reflections at 
that level, so that, e.g., with respect to remembered things at the second level 
of remembering, [there are] reflections on perceivings of just these things 
belonging to the same level (thus presentiated at the second level). 
Furthermore: each noematic level is an ‗objectivation‘ ‗of‘ the data of the 
following [level].― (Hua 3/1, §101). Acknowledging that Husserl is not 
motivated to iterate intentional acts infinitely many times, Becker suggests 
using such hierarchy to clarify Cantor‘s view of transfinite numbers. Using 
intuitionist terminology, he then characterizes Cantor‘s transfinite numbers 
as a ―werdende Folge, deren ‗zukunft‘ nicht voraussehbar iβt‖ (Becker 1973, 
112); as a becoming succession that has a future that is not foreseeable. 
Becker is explicit about the potential character of the hierarchy. (Similar 
hierarchies were at the time also proposed by many, e.g., by Russell in his 
type theory and Weyl‘s construction in The Continuum (1917) to combat 
paradoxes of set theory). 
6 „Die Unendlichkeit der Welt, die Unendlichkeit der Teleologie, die in der 
Unendlichkeit von Monaden waltend Welt werden lieβ und fortwerden, 
immerfort neu und anders werden lässt, und doch als identische Welt – das 
ist nicht eine einlinige oder mehrlinige Unendlichkeit, es ist ein unendliches 
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Strahlensystem von Unendlichkeiten, ich denken mit einer Unendlichkeit von 
Stufen, deren jede ihre Axiomatik hat― (BW3, 498).  
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